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Abstract—With the rapid advances in computing and information technologies, traditional access control models have become
inadequate in terms of capturing fine-grained, and expressive security requirements of newly emerging applications. An attribute-based
access control (ABAC) model provides a more flexible approach for addressing the authorization needs of complex and dynamic
systems. While organizations are interested in employing newer authorization models, migrating to such models pose as a significant
challenge. Many large-scale businesses need to grant authorization to their user populations that are potentially distributed across
disparate and heterogeneous computing environments. Each of these computing environments may have its own access control
model. The manual development of a single policy framework for an entire organization is tedious, costly, and error-prone.
In this paper, we present a methodology for automatically learning ABAC policy rules from access logs of a system to simplify the
policy development process. The proposed approach employs an unsupervised learning-based algorithm for detecting patterns in
access logs and extracting ABAC authorization rules from these patterns. In addition, we present two policy improvement algorithms,
including rule pruning and policy refinement algorithms to generate a higher quality mined policy. Finally, we implement a prototype of
the proposed approach to demonstrate its feasibility.
Index Terms—Access Control, Attribute Based Access Control, Policy Mining, Policy Engineering, Machine Learning, Clustering.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
A CCESS control systems are a critical component of aninformation system that protect information resources
from unauthorized accesses. Various access control models
and approaches have been proposed in the literature in-
cluding Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [1] [2], Manda-
tory Access Control (MAC) [3] [4], and Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) [5]. However, with the rapid advances in
newer computing and information technologies (e.g., social
networks, Internet of Things (IoT), cloud/edge computing,
etc.), existing access control (AC) models have become in-
adequate in providing flexible and expressive authorization
services [6]. For example, a health care environment requires
a more expressive AC model that meets the needs of pa-
tients, health care providers as well as other stakeholders
in the health care ecosystem [7], [8]. Attribute Based Access
Control (ABAC) models present a promising approach that
addresses newer challenges in emerging applications [9].
An ABAC approach grants access rights to users based
on attributes of entities in the system (i.e., user attributes,
object attributes, and environmental conditions) and a set of
authorization rules.
Although organizations and developers are interested
in employing the next generation of AC models, adopting
such policy frameworks pose a significant challenge. Many
large organizations need to grant authorization to their vast
user populations that are highly distributed across disparate
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computing environments, including legacy systems. Each
of these computing environments may have its own AC
model. The manual development of a single policy for the
entire organization is tedious and error-prone. Policy Mining
techniques have been proposed in the literature to address
such challenges to help organizations cut the cost, time, and
error of policy development/management. Policy mining
algorithms ease the migration to more recent authorization
models by completely (or partially) automating the devel-
opment of AC policies.
Policy mining techniques were first introduced for devel-
oping RBAC policies. Kuhlmann et al. coined the term “role
mining" to refer to a data mining approach that constructs
roles from a given permission assignment dataset [10]; this
work was followed by various role mining techniques [11],
[12], [13]. Although the proposed approaches are beneficial
in developing optimal sets of roles, they are not applicable
in extracting ABAC policies.
Xu and Stoller were the first to study the problem of
mining ABAC policies from given access control matrices
or logs [14], [15]. Following that, several researchers have
investigated various ABAC policy mining techniques [16],
[17], [18]. However, these studies suffer from several limita-
tions:
First of all, the earlier works do not support mining
authorization rules with negative filters. An ABAC policy
rule can comprise of a set of positive and negative filters.
Negative filters are useful in scenarios when an exception
needs to be expressed. For example, a healthcare provider
can express the following rule using a negative attribute fil-
ter: “A nurse can read a patient’s record except for payment
purposes." Using negative filters in rule expressions results
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2in a more concise authorization policy (Section 5).
Second, some proposed approaches such as in [15], [17]
are unable to mine a high-quality policy when the given
access log is not complete in the sense that every possible
combination of attribute values is not included in the access
log (Section 3).
Third, the proposed approaches are unable to mine a pol-
icy from noisy access logs containing over-assignments and
under-assignments [16], [18]. Having noisy access records
is a common problem in evolving domains such as IoT or
social networks [19]. It is essential that an ABAC policy
miner should be capable of handling a reasonable amount
of noise to be applicable to real-world domains.
Last but not least, the existing approaches do not include
techniques for improving the mined policy after the first
round of extraction. In addition, in scenarios where the
authorization policies may change over time (such as in
social networks with addition and removal of various ap-
plications), these approaches do not provide any guidelines
for adjusting the policy. This makes practical deployment of
these approaches not useful.
Furthermore, none of the previous work addresses these
issues in an integrated way. In this paper, we propose
a machine learning based ABAC policy mining approach
to address these challenges. To summarize, the primary
contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We propose an unsupervised learning approach to
extract ABAC policy rules that contain both positive
and negative attribute filters as well as positive and
negative relation conditions.
2) The proposed policy mining approach is practical
even with an incomplete set of access logs and in
the presence of noise.
3) As part of the unsupervised learning based ap-
proach, we propose the rule pruning and policy
refinement algorithms to enhance the quality of the
mined policy and to ease its maintenance.
4) We propose a policy quality metric based on policy
correctness and conciseness to be able to compare
different sets of mined policy rules and to select the
best one based on given criteria.
5) We implement a prototype of the proposed model
and evaluate it using various ABAC policies to
show its efficiency and effectiveness.
To the best of our knowledge, our proposed approach
is the first unsupervised learning based ABAC policy min-
ing method that can be used to extract both positive and
negative attribute and relationship filters and its efficiency
is independent of the overall complexity of access control
policy including the number of rules in the policy and the
number of filters/relations in each rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we overview the ABAC model and its policy language
as well as an unsupervised learning algorithm. In Section 3,
we define the ABAC policy extraction problem, discuss the
related challenges, and introduce the metrics for evaluating
the extracted policy. In Section 4, we present the proposed
approach. In Section 5, we present the evaluation of the
proposed approach on various sets of policies. We present
the related work in Section 6 and the conclusions and future
work in Section 8.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we overview ABAC, the ABAC policy lan-
guage, and the unsupervised learning algorithm.
2.1 ABAC Model
In 2013, NIST published a “Guide to ABAC Definition and
Consideration" [9], according to which, “the ABAC engine can
make an access control decision based on the assigned attributes
of the requester, the assigned attributes of the object, environment
conditions, and a set of policies that are specified in terms of those
attributes and conditions.” Throughout the paper, we use user
attributes, object attributes, and session attributes to refer to the
attributes of the requester, attributes of the object, and the
environmental attributes/conditions, respectively.
Accordingly, U, O, S, OP are sets of users, objects,
sessions, and operations in a system and user attributes
(Au), object attributes (Ao), and session attributes (As) are
mappings of subject attributes, object attributes, and en-
vironmental attributes as defined in the NIST Guide [9].
E = U ∪ O ∪ S and A = Au ∪ Ao ∪ As are the sets of all
entities and all attributes in the system, respectively.
Definition 1. (Attribute Range). Given an attribute a ∈ A,
the attribute range Va is the set of all valid values for a in
the system.
Definition 2. (Attribute Function). Given an entity e ∈ E ,
an attribute function fa_e is a function that maps an entity
to a specific value from the attribute range. Specifically,
fa_e(e, a) returns the value of attribute a for entity e.
Example 1. fa_e(John, position) = faculty indicates that the
value of attribute position for user John is faculty.
Example 2. fa_e(dep1, crs) = {cs101, cs601, cs602} represents
that the value of attribute crs for object dep1 is a set
{cs101, cs601, cs602}.
Each attribute in the system can be a single-valued
(atomic) or multi-valued (set). In Example 1 position is a
single-valued attribute while crs is a multi-valued attribute
in Example 2. For simplicity, we consider only atomic at-
tributes in this work.
Attribute filters are used to denote the sets of users,
objects, and sessions to which an authorization rule applies.
Definition 3. (Attribute Filter). An attribute filter is defined
as a set of tuples F = {〈a, v |!v〉| a ∈ A and v ∈ Va}. Here
〈a, v〉 is a positive attribute filter tuple that indicates a
has value v, and 〈a, !v〉 is a negative attribute filter tuple
that indicates a has any value in its range except v.
Example 3. Tuple 〈label, !top-secret〉 points to all entities in
the system that do not have “top-secret" as their security
label “label".
Definition 4. (Attribute Filter Satisfaction). An entity e ∈ E
satisfies an attribute filter F , denoted as e |= F , iff
∀〈ai, vi〉 ∈ F : fa_e(e, ai) = vi ∧
∀〈ai, !vi〉 ∈ F : fa_e(e, ai) , vi .
3Example 4. Suppose Au = {dept, position, courses}. The set
of tuples FU = {〈dept,CS〉, 〈position, grad〉} denotes a
user attribute filter. Here, the graduate students in the
CS department satisfy FU .
Definition 5. (Relation Condition). A relation condition is
defined as a set of tuples R = {〈a, b|!b〉| a, b ∈ A ∧ a ,
b}. Here 〈a, b〉 is a positive relation condition tuple that
indicates a and b have the same values, and 〈a, !b〉 is a
negative relation condition tuple that indicates a and b
do not have the same values.
A relation is used in a rule to denote the equality con-
dition between two attributes of users, objects, or sessions.
Note that the two attributes in the relation condition must
have the same range.
Definition 6. (Relation Condition Satisfaction). An entity
e ∈ E satisfies a relation condition R, denoted as e |= R,
iff ∀〈ai, bi〉 ∈ R : fa_e(e, ai) = fa_e(e, bi)
∀〈ai, !bi〉 ∈ R : fa_e(e, ai) , fa_e(e, bi).
Definition 7. (Access Request). An access request is a tuple
q = 〈u, o, s, op〉 where user u ∈ U sends a request to the
system to perform operation op ∈ OP on object o ∈ O in
session s ∈ S.
Definition 8. (Authorization Tuple/Access Log). An autho-
rization tuple is a tuple t = 〈q, d〉 containing decision
d made by the access control system for request q. An
Access Log L is a set of such tuples.
The decision d of an authorization tuple can be permit
or deny. The authorization tuple with permit decision means
that user u can perform an operation op on an object o in
session s. The authorization tuple with deny decision means
that user u cannot perform operation op on object o in
session s.
Access log is a union of Positive Access Log, L+, and
Negative Access Log, L−, where:
L+ = {〈q, d〉|〈q, d〉 ∈ L ∧ d = permit},
and
L− = {〈q, d〉|〈q, d〉 ∈ L ∧ d = deny}.
Definition 9. (ABAC Rule). An access rule ρ is a tuple
〈F ,R, op〉, where F is an attribute filter, R is a relation
condition, and op is an operation.
Example 5. Consider rule ρ1 = 〈{〈position, student〉,
〈location, campus〉, 〈type, article〉}, {〈deptu, depto〉}, read〉.
It can be interpreted as “A student can read an article
if he/she is on campus and his/her department matches the
department of the article".
Definition 10. (Rule Satisfaction) An access request with
q = 〈u, o, s, op〉 is said to satisfy a rule ρ, denoted as q |= ρ,
iff
〈u, o, s〉 |= F ∧ 〈u, o, s〉 |= R ∧ opq = opρ .
Definition 11. (ABAC Policy). An ABAC policy is a tuple
pi = 〈E,OP, A, fa_e,P〉 where E , OP, A, and P are sets
of entities, operations, attributes, and ABAC rules in the
system and fa_e is the attribute function.
Definition 12. (ABAC Policy Decision). The decision of an
ABAC policy pi for an access request q denoted as dpi(q)
is permit iff:
∃ρ ∈ pi : q |= ρ
otherwise, the decision is deny.
If an access request satisfies a rule of the access control
policy, then the decision of the system for such access
request is permit. If the access request does not satisfy any
rule in the access control policy then the decision of the
system for such access request is deny.
TABLE 1 summarizes the notations used in this paper.
2.2 Unsupervised Learning Algorithm
Unsupervised learning algorithms try to infer a function
that describes the structure of unlabeled data. They are
useful when no or very few labeled data is available. We
leverage such methods for extracting ABAC policies from
access logs.
In particular, given a set of authorization tuples, we
employ an unsupervised learning approach to mine and
extract an ABAC policy that has high quality. An unsu-
pervised learning approach is suitable because there is no
labeled data available for desired ABAC rules. ABAC policy
extraction, in this case, can be considered as a mapping
between authorization tuples to a set of clusters that are
representative of the desired ABAC rules. Such a mapping
can be expressed as a function, h : X → Y, where:
1) X is a set of authorization tuples (i.e., access log).
2) Y is a set of numbered labels (i.e., cluster labels,
each cluster corresponding to a rule of the ABAC
policy pi).
The goal is then to learn the function h with low cluster-
ing error and mine the desired policy with high quality.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 ABAC Policy Extraction Problem
Although organizations are interested in employing an
ABAC model, adopting it is a big challenge for them.
The manual development of such a policy is tedious and
error-prone. Policy Mining techniques have been proposed
to address such challenges in order to reduce the cost,
time, and error of policy development/maintenance. ABAC
policy mining algorithms ease the migration to the ABAC
framework by completely (or partially) automating the de-
velopment of ABAC policy rules.
The primary input to a policy mining algorithm is the log
of authorization decisions in the system. The log indicates
authorization decision (i.e., permit or deny) for any given
access request by a user of the system. For ABAC policy
mining, such a log is accompanied by attributes of entities
involved in the log entries. The goal of a policy mining
algorithm is to extract ABAC policy rules from access logs
that have high quality with respect to some quality metrics
(e.g., policy size and correctness).
We define the ABAC policy extraction problem formally
as follows:
4TABLE 1
Notations
U ,O, S, OP sets of users, objects, sessions, and operations
Au , Ao , and As sets of user attributes, object attributes, and session attributes
E =U ∪O ∪ S set of all entities
A = Au ∪ Ao ∪ As set of all attributes
Va Attribute Range: set of all valid values for a ∈ A
fa_e(e, a) Attribute Function: a function that maps an entity e ∈ E to a value from Va
F = { 〈a, v |!v〉 | a ∈ A∧ v ∈ Va } Attribute Filter
R = { 〈a, b〉 | a, b ∈ A∧ a , b ∧Va = Vb } Relation Condition
q = 〈u, o, s, op〉 Access Request
t = 〈q, d〉 Authorization Tuple, showing decision d made by the system for request q
L Access Log, set of authorization tuples
L+ = { 〈q, d〉 | 〈q, d〉 ∈ L ∧ d = permit } Positive Access Log
L− = { 〈q, d〉 | 〈q, d〉 ∈ L ∧ d = deny } Negative Access Log
ρ = 〈F, R, op, d〉 ABAC Rule
P set of all policy rules
pi = 〈E,OP, A, fa_e, P〉 ABAC Policy
dpi (q) the decision of an ABAC policy pi for an access request q
TPpi |L , FPpi |L , TNpi |L , and FNpi |L Relative True Positive, False Positive, True Negative, and False Negative Rates
ACCpi |L Relative Accuracy Rate
F-scorepi |L Relative F-score
WSC(pi) Weighted Structural Complexity of policy pi
Qpi Policy Quality Metric
Definition 13. (ABAC Policy Extraction Problem). Let
I =< E,OP, A, fa_e,L >, where the components are as
defined earlier, then the ABAC policy extraction problem
is to find a set of rules R such that the ABAC policy
pi =< E,OP, A, fa_e,R > has high quality with respect to
L.
3.2 Challenges and Requirements
For an ABAC policy extraction approach to be applicable
to a wide range of real-world scenarios, we identify the
following challenges and requirements:
1) Correctness of Mined Policy: The mined policy must
be consistent with input authorization log in a way
that the access decision of the mined policy must
result in the same access decision of the log entry.
An inconsistent extracted policy may result in sit-
uations in which an originally authorized access is
denied (more restrictive) or originally unauthorized
access is permitted (less restrictive) by the system.
2) Complexity of Mined Policy: The policy mining algo-
rithm should endeavor to extracting a policy that is
as concise as possible. Since the policy rules need to
be manipulated by human administrators, the more
concise they are, the more manageable and easier to
interpret they would be. In addition, succinct rules
are desirable as they are easier to audit and manage.
3) Negative Attribute Filters: The ABAC policy mining
solution should support both positive and negative
attribute filters which will result in more concise
and comprehensible mined policy.
4) Relation Conditions: The solution should support the
extraction of relation conditions for policy mining in
order to generate more concise and comprehensible
mined policy.
5) Sparse Logs: In real-world, the access log input to
the policy mining algorithm may be sparse, repre-
senting only a small fraction of all possible access
requests. The policy mining algorithm must be able
to extract useful rules even from a sparse log.
6) Mining Negative Authorization Rules: An ABAC pol-
icy can contain both positive and negative rules
which permit or deny access requests, respectively.
The use of negative rules is helpful in situations
where specifying exceptions to more general rules
is important. Being able to define negative policy
rules would result in more concise ABAC policy.
Thus, the policy mining algorithm should be able
to extract both positive and negative authorization
rules.
7) Noisy Authorization Log: In the real world and with
complex and dynamic information systems, it is
possible to have a noisy authorization log consisting
of over-assignments and under-assignments. These
issues happen either due to a wrong configuration
of the original authorization system or improper
policy updates by administrators. The policy mining
algorithm should be capable of extracting meaning-
ful rules even with the presence of an acceptable
amount of noise in the input access log.
8) Dynamic and Evolving Policies: The proposed method
should employ a mechanism to support the dynam-
icity of the information systems and their authoriza-
tion policies and ease the maintenance of evolving
systems.
Our proposed approach addresses all the requirements
except the sixth one. Table 2 shows the challenges that are
addressed by our proposed approach and how it improves
upon the state-of-the-art policy mining techniques.
3.3 Evaluation Metrics
One of the main metrics for evaluating the quality of an
extracted policy is how accurately it matches the original
policy. That means the decisions made by the extracted
policy for a set of access requests should be similar to the
5TABLE 2
State-of-the-art ABAC Rule Mining Techniques
Xu et al. [15] Medvet et al. [16] Iyer et. al [17] Cotrini et al. [18] Our Proposed Approach
Policy Correctness X X X X X
Policy Complexity X X X X X
Negative Attribute Filters 7 7 7 7 X
Relation Conditions X X X 7 X
Sparse Logs 7 X 7 X X
Negative Authorization Rules 7 7 X 7 7
Noisy Authorization Log X 7 7 7 X
System Dynamicity 7 7 7 7 X
decisions made by the original policy for that set of requests.
As an example, if the decision of the original policy for an
access request q is permit, then the decision of the mined
policy for the same access request must be permit as well.
If the mined policy denies the same access request, then
we record this authorization tuple as a False Negative. We
define Relative True Positive, Relative False Positive, Relative
True Negative, and Relative False Negative rates, respectively,
as follows:
Definition 14. (Relative True Positive Rate). Given an access
log L and an ABAC policy pi, the relative true positive
rate of pi regarding L denoted as TPpi |L is the portion
of positive access logs that the decision of pi for them is
permit:
TPpi |L =
|{〈q, d〉 ∈ L+ |dpi(q) = permit}|
|L+ |
Here, |s | is the cardinality of set s.
Definition 15. (Relative False Positive Rate). The relative
false positive rate of pi regarding L denoted as FPpi |L is
the portion of negative access logs that the decision of pi
for them is permit:
FPpi |L =
|{〈q, d〉 ∈ L− |dpi(q) = permit}|
|L− |
Similarly, we calculate the relative true negative rate and
false negative rate of pi regarding L denoted as TNpi |L and
FNpi |L as follows:
TNpi |L =
|{〈q, d〉 ∈ L− |dpi(q) = deny}|
|L− |
FNpi |L =
|{〈q, d〉 ∈ L+ |dpi(q) = deny}|
|L+ |
The relative precision and relative recall are calculated as
follows:
Precisionpi |L =
TPpi |L
TPpi |L + FPpi |L
Recallpi |L =
TPpi |L
TPpi |L + FNpi |L
The relative accuracy metric, ACCpi |L , measures the ac-
curacy of mined policy pi with regards to the decisions made
by the original policy indicated by L and is defined formally
as follows:
Definition 16. (Relative Accuracy). Given the relative true
positive and negative rates, the relative accuracy of pi
regarding L denoted as ACCpi |L is calculated as follows:
ACCpi |L =
TPpi |L + TNpi |L
TPpi |L + TNpi |L + FPpi |L + FNpi |L
As accuracy may be misleading in unbalanced data sets
[20] (which is very probable in case of access logs), we use
relative F-score to better evaluate the mined policy:
F-scorepi |L = 2 ·
Precisionpi |L · Recallpi |L
Precisionpi |L + Recallpi |L
On the other hand, as the number of filters in each rule
and the number of rules in an access control policy increases,
policy intelligibility would decrease and maintenance of the
policy would become harder. Hence, complexity is another
key metric for evaluating the quality of a policy. Weighted
Structural Complexity (WSC) is a generalization of policy
size and was first introduced for RBAC policies [21] and
later extended for ABAC policies [15]. WSC is consistent
with usability studies of access control rules, which in-
dicates that the more concise the policies are the more
manageable they become [22]. Informally, for a given ABAC
policy, its WSC is a weighted sum of the number of its
elements. Formally, for an ABAC policy pi with rules P, its
WSC is defined as follows:
WSC(pi) = WSC(P)
WSC(P) =
∑
ρ∈P
WSC(ρ)
WSC(ρ = 〈FU, FO, FS,R, op, d〉) = w1WSC(FU)+
w2WSC(FO) + w3WSC(FS) + w4WSC(R)
∀s ∈ {FU, FO, FS,R} : WSC(s) =
∑
|s |
where |s | is the cardinality of set s and the wis are user-
specified weights.
Van Rijsbergen’s proposed an effectiveness measure for
combining two different metrics P and R as follows [23]:
E = 1 − 1
α
P
+
1 − α
R
To be able to compare the quality of different mined
ABAC policies, we combine the two metrics based on Van
6Rijsbergen’s effectiveness measure [23] and define the Policy
Quality Metric as follows:
Qpi = ( αF-scorepi |L +
1 − α
∆WSCpi
)−1
Here α =
1
1 + β2
where β determines the importance of
relative F-score over policy complexity and ∆WSCpi shows
the relative loss of the complexity with regards to the
complexity of worst-case mined policy. ∆WSCpi is calculated
as follows:
∆WSCpi =
WSCmax −WSC(pi) + 1
WSCmax
WSCmax is the weighted structural complexity of the worst-
case mined policy.
Definition 17. (Worst-case Mined Policy). Worst-case mined
policy piw is the policy that is extracted by iterating
through access log L and adding an access control rule
for each authorization tuple if it’s not already included
in the mined policy. The corresponding rule for each
authorization tuple includes all attributes of user, object,
and subject of that authorization tuple.
The worst-case mined policy has F-score equal to one;
this occurs if the access log is complete, which means that
every possible combination of attribute values are repre-
sented in the access log. On the other hand, it has a high
complexity resulting in very low quality policy. Considering
the equal importance of relative F-score and relative loss of
complexity of the policy, we calculate the quality measure
as follows:
Qpi =
2 · F-scorepi |L · ∆WSCpi
F-scorepi |L + ∆WSCpi
A mined policy with a higher F-score would have a
higher policy quality. On the other hand, as the complexity
of a policy increases, its quality will decrease. The intuition
here is that once an extracted policy reaches a high F-score,
adding additional rules will lead to a decrease in Qpi .
For the worst-case mined policy piw , ∆WSCpiw ≈ 0, so its
policy quality Qpiw is very close to zero. For an empty mined
policy pie (a policy without any rule), while ∆WSCpie ≈ 1, as
it denies all the access requests, its false negative rate is one
and its true positive rate is zero. So its precision is zero and
as a result, its F-score is zero as well. So the quality of the
empty policy Qpie is zero, too.
The worst-case mined policy and the empty mined pol-
icy are the two extreme cases with policy quality equal to
zero. Other mined policies between these two cases have
higher policy quality than zero.
4 PROPOSED APPROACH
Our proposed learning-based ABAC policy extraction pro-
cedure consists of the steps summarized in Figure 1.
1. Data Pre-processing
Handling missing
values, Converting to
categorical values 2. Parameter Tuning
Finding best number of clusters,
best cluster initialization, and
appropriate thresholds 
3. Clustering
Clustering data using
k-mean/k-mode
algorithm
4. Rule Extraction
Finding effective
attributes and
relations, Building
Rules
5. Rule Pruning
Removing duplicate
rules, Finding similar
rules and eliminating
them
6. Policy Refinement
Refining policy rules
based on FP and FN
records
Fig. 1. Overview of the Proposed Approach.
4.1 Data Pre-processing
As features of our learning algorithm are categorical vari-
ables, the first step in pre-processing the access log is to
convert all numerical variables to their corresponding cate-
gorical values.
We also need to handle missing values in this step. As
the frequency of each attribute value is an important factor
in our rule extraction algorithm (Section 4.4) for deciding
if an attribute is effective or not, it’s important to replace
missing values in a way that it doesn’t mess up with the
original frequency of each attribute value. For this purpose,
we replace each missing value by UNK (i.e., unknown).
4.2 Selection of Learning Algorithm
We use the K-modes algorithm [24], which is a well known
unsupervised learning algorithm used for clustering cate-
gorical data. K-modes has been proved effective in mining
ABAC policies [25]; this algorithm uses an initialization
method based on both the distance between data points
and the density of data points. Using both density and
distance when initializing clusters help avoid two problems:
(i) clustering outliers as new clusters are based only on the
distances; and (ii) creating new clusters in the surrounding
of one center based only on the density. Compared to a
random initialization method, this method provides more
robustness and better accuracy in the clustering process [24].
4.3 Parameter Tuning
In the next step, we tune the learning parameters. There are
several challenges that need to be addressed in this step,
which include the following:
4.3.1 Number of Clusters (k)
One of the main challenges in an unsupervised learning
is determining the number of clusters, k. In our sample
policies, as we know the number of rules in each policy,
we can set the number of clusters beforehand but in a
real situation as we do not know the size of the rules in
7advance, making the correct choice of k is difficult. One of
the popular methods for determining the number of clusters
in an unsupervised learning model is the Elbow Method [26],
[27]. This method is based on total within group sum of
squares. k will be chosen as the number of clusters if adding
another cluster doesn’t give much better modeling of the
data (i.e., the elbow point of the graph).
As a second approach, we choose a number of clusters
(k) which gives the best modeling of the data in terms of the
policy quality metric. For this purpose, we run our clustering
algorithm for different values of k and calculate the accuracy
of the corresponding model using 10-fold cross-validation.
The value of k that maximizes the accuracy of the model is
selected as the final number of clusters.
Note that increasing k will ultimately reduce the amount
of clustering error or it will increase the accuracy of the
model, but by increasing the number of clusters, the num-
ber of extracted rules will also increase resulting in more
complexity (i.e., higher WSC). So it is important to find an
optimal k that balances between policy accuracy and WSC.
4.3.2 Cluster Initialization & Local Optima
Different cluster initializations can lead to a different set of
clusters as k-means/k-modes may converge to local optima.
To overcome this issue, for a given number of clusters, k, we
train multiple models with different cluster initializations
and then select the partition with the smallest clustering
error.
4.4 Policy Rules Extraction
The main phase in our proposed approach is the extraction
of ABAC policy rules. In the first step, we need to collect all
the authorization tuples related to each rule of the policy. We
use data clustering for this purpose. We divide the access log
into clusters where the records in each cluster correspond to
one AC rule in the system. This is done based on finding
similar patterns between features (i.e., attribute values) of
the records (i.e., access control tuples). In the second step,
we extract the attribute filters of such a rule. We adapt the
rule extraction algorithm in [25] and extend it to extract both
positive and negative attribute filters. We define effective
positive attribute and effective negative attribute as follows:
Definition 18. (Effective Positive (Negative) Attribute). Let
S = {〈a, v〉} be the set of all possible attribute-value pairs
in a system; we define 〈aj, vj〉 ∈ S (〈aj, !vj〉 ∈ S) as an
effective positive (negative) attribute pair of ρi correspond-
ing to cluster Ci , where the frequency of occurrence of vj
in the set of all the records of cluster Ci is much higher
(lower) than its frequency of occurrence in the original
data; this is determined based on a threshold TP (TN ).
The attribute expression 〈aj, vj〉 (〈aj, !vj〉) is added to the
attribute filters of the extracted rule ρi for Ci .
In the final step, we extract the relation conditions for
AC rules for each cluster. This will be done based on the
frequency of equality between pairs of attributes in the
records of each cluster. We define effective positive relation
and effective negative relation as follows:
Definition 19. (Effective Positive (Negative) Relation). Let
R = {〈a, b〉} be the set of all possible relations between
pairs of attributes in the system; we define 〈aj, bj〉 as
an effective positive (negative) relation pairs of ρi cor-
responding to cluster Ci , where the frequency of aj
equals bj in all the records of cluster Ci is much higher
(lower) than their frequency in the original data; this is
determined based on a threshold TP (TN ). The relation
〈aj, bj〉 (〈aj, !bj〉) is added to the relation conditions of
the extracted rule ρi for this cluster.
Algorithms 1 and 2 show effective attribute and effective
relation extraction procedures, respectively.
Algorithm 1 Effective attribute extraction algorithm
1: procedure EXTRACTATTRIBUTEFILTERS
Input: Ci , A, V , L, TP , TN
Output: F
2: F ← ∅
3: for all a ∈ A do
4: for all vj ∈ Va do
5: if Freq(vj,Ci) − Freq(vj,L) > TP then
6: F i ← F ∪ 〈a, vj〉
7: end if
8: if Freq(vj,L) − Freq(vj,Ci) > TN then
9: F i ← F ∪ 〈a, !vj〉
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
return ρi
13: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Effective relation extraction algorithm
1: procedure EXTRACTRELATIONS
Input: Ci , A, L, θP , θN
Output: R
2: R ← ∅
3: for all a ∈ A do
4: for all b ∈ A and b , a do
5: if Freq(a = b,Ci) - Freq(a = b,L)>θP then
6: R ← R ∪ 〈a, b〉
7: end if
8: if Freq(a = b,L) - Freq(a = b,Ci)>θN then
9: R ← R ∪ 〈a, !b〉
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
return R
13: end procedure
4.5 Policy Enhancement
After the first phase of policy rule extraction, we get a policy
which may not be as accurate and concise as we desire. We
enhance the quality of the mined policy through iterations
of policy improvement steps that include: rule pruning and
policy refinement.
4.5.1 Rule Pruning
During the rule extraction phase, it’s possible to have two
clusters that correspond to the same rule. As a result, the
8extracted rules of these clusters are very similar to each
other. Having two similar rules in the final policy increases
the complexity of the mined policy while it may not help
the accuracy of the policy and as a result, it hurts the policy
quality. To address such an issue, in the rule pruning step,
we identify similar rules and eliminate the ones whose
removal improves the policy quality more. If eliminating
neither of the two rules improves the policy quality, we
keep both the rules. This may happen when we have two
very similar AC rules in the original policy. We measure the
similarity between two rules using Jaccard similarity [28] as
follows:
J(S1, S2) = |S1 ∩ S2 |/|S1 ∪ S2 |
So we calculate the similarity between two rules ρ1 and
ρ2 as follows:
J(ρ1, ρ2) =[ ∑
F∈{FU,FO,FS }
|Fρ1 ∩ Fρ2 | + |Rρ1 ∩ Rρ2 | + |opρ1 ∩ opρ2 |
]
[ ∑
F∈{FU,FO,FS }
|Fρ1 ∪ Fρ2 | + |Rρ1 ∪ Rρ2 | + |opρ1 ∪ opρ2 |
]
We consider two rules to be similar if their Jaccard
similarity score is more than 0.5, which means that the size
of their common elements is more than half of the size of the
union of their elements. Algorithm 3 shows the rule pruning
procedure.
Algorithm 3 Rule Pruning algorithm
1: procedure RULEPRUNING
Input: pi
Output: pi
2: P ← pi.P
3: q← CALCQUALITY(P)
4: for all ρi ∈ P do
5: for all ρj ∈ P and ρi , ρj do
6: if SIMILARITY(ρi, ρj) > 0.5 then
7: Pi ← P/ρi
8: Pj ← P/ρj
9: qi ← CALCQUALITY(Pi)
10: qj ← CALCQUALITY(Pj)
11: if qi >= q and qi >= qj then
12: P ← Pi
13: end if
14: if qj >= q and qj >= qi then
15: P ← Pj
16: end if
17: end if
18: end for
19: end for
return P
20: end procedure
4.5.2 Policy Refinement
During the rule extraction phase, it is possible to extract
rules that are either too restricted or too relaxed compared
to the original policy rules. A rule is restricted if it employs
more filters than the original rule.
Example 6. Consider the following two rules:
ρ1 = 〈{(position, f aculty)},{(type, gradebook)},
{setScore}, permit〉
ρ2 = 〈{(position, f aculty),(uDept, EE)},
{(type, gradebook)},{setScore}, permit〉
Here ρ2 is more restricted than ρ1 as it imposes more
conditions on the user attributes.
Having such a restricted rule in the mined policy would
result in a larger number of FNs as an access request that
would be permitted by the original rule will be denied by
the restricted rule.
On the other hand, an extracted rule is more relaxed
compared to the original rule if it misses some of the filters.
In Example 6, ρ1 is more relaxed than ρ2. Such a relaxed rule
would result in more FPs as it permits access requests that
should be denied as per the original policies.
To address these issues, we propose a policy refinement
procedure which is shown in Algorithm 4. Here, we try
to refine the mined policy (pim) based on the patterns dis-
covered in the FN or FP records. These patterns are used
to eliminate extra filters from restricted rules or append
missing filters to relax the rules.
To extract patterns from the FN or FP records, we apply
our rule extraction procedure on these records to get the
corresponding policies piFN and piFP . Here our training data
are FN and FP records, respectively. We compare the ex-
tracted FN or FP rules with the mined policy and remove the
extra filters or append the missed ones to the corresponding
rules. As an example, consider the FP records. Here, our
goal is to extract the patterns that are common between
access requests that were permitted based on the mined
policy while they should have been denied based on the
original policy.
In each step of refinement, a rule from pim that is similar
to a rule from piFN or piFP based on the Jaccard similarity
(Section 4.5.1) is selected and then refined in two ways as
discuss below.
Policy refinement based on piFN : In the case of FN records,
two situations are possible: a rule is missing from the mined
policy (pim) or one of the rules in pim is restricted. To resolve
this issue, for each rule ρi ∈ piFN :
• if there is a similar rule ρj ∈ pim then we refine ρj as
follows:
∀ f ∈ F : Fρ j = Fρ j/(Fρ j/Fρi)
where F = FU ∪ FO ∪ FS ∪ R. So, the extra filters are
removed from the restricted rule (ρj).
• if there is no such rule, then ρi is the missing rule and
we add it to pim.
Policy refinement based on piFP : In the case of FP records,
some filters might be missing in an extracted rule in the
mined policy (pim); so for each rule ρi ∈ piFP , we refine the
mined policy as follows:
∀ f ∈ F : Fρ j = Fρ j ∪ (Fρi/Fρ j)
where F = FU ∪ FO ∪ FS ∪ R includes all the filters in the
rule. So, the missing filters are added to the relaxed rule (ρj ).
9These refinements can be done in multiple iterations
until further refinement does not give a better model in
terms of policy quality Qpi .
Algorithm 4 Policy refinement algorithm
1: procedure REFINEPOLICY
Input: A, L
Output: pim
2: FN ← GETFNS(pim,L)
3: piFN ← EXTRACTPOLICY(FN)
4: for all ρi ∈ piFN .P do
5: Rs ← GETSIMILARRULES(piFN .P, pim.P)
6: if |Rs | = 0 then
7: pim.P ← pim.P ∪ ρi
8: else
9: for all ρj ∈ Rs do
10: for all F ∈ FU ∪ FO ∪ FS ∪ R do
11: Fρ j ← Fρ j \(Fρ j \Fρi )
12: end for
13: end for
14: end if
15: end for
16: FP ← GETFPS(pim,L)
17: piFP ← EXTRACTPOLICY(F P)
18: for all ρi ∈ piFP .P do
19: Rs ← GETSIMILARRULES(piFP .P, pim.P)
20: if |Rs | ! = 0 then
21: for all ρj ∈ Rs do
22: for all F ∈ FU ∪ FO ∪ FS ∪ R do
23: Fρ j ← Fρ j ∪ (Fρi \Fρ j )
24: end for
25: end for
26: end if
27: end for
return pim
28: end procedure
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have implemented a prototype of our proposed model
presented in Section 4. Here, we present our experimental
evaluation.
5.1 Datasets
We perform our experiments on multiple datasets including
synthesized and real ones. The synthesized access logs are
generated from two sets of ABAC policies: a manually
written set of policies adapted from [15] and a completely
randomly generated set of policies. To synthesize our input
data, for each ABAC policy (i.e., University Policy, Healthcare
Policy, etc.), a set of authorization tuples is generated and the
outcome of the ABAC policy for each access right is evalu-
ated. The authorization tuples with permit as their outcomes
are the inputs to our unsupervised learning model.
Our real datasets are built from access logs provided by
Amazon in Kaggle competition [29] and available in the UCI
machine learning repository [30].
Manual Policy - University: This policy is adapted from
[15] and it controls access of different users including stu-
dents, instructors, teaching assistants, etc., to various objects
(applications, gradebooks, etc.).
Manual Policy - Healthcare: This policy is adapted from
[15] and is used to control access by different users (e.g.
nurses, doctors, etc.) to electronic health records (EHRs) and
EHR items.
Manual Policy - Project Management: This policy is
adapted from [15] and it controls access by different users
(e.g. department managers, project leaders, employees, etc.)
to various objects (e.g. budgets,schedules and tasks).
Random Policies: The authorization rules for this policy
is generated completely randomly from random sets of
attributes and attribute values.
Real Dataset - Amazon Kaggle: The Kaggle competition
dataset [29] includes access requests made by AmazonâA˘Z´s
employees over two years. Each record in this dataset de-
scribes an employeeâA˘Z´s request to a resource and whether
the request was authorized or not. A record consists of the
employeeâA˘Z´s attribute values and the resource identifier.
The dataset includes more than 12,000 users and 7,000
resources. In this experiment we focused on the top five
requested resources in the dataset.
Real Dataset - Amazon UCI: This dataset is provided
by Amazon in the UCI machine learning repository [30].
It includes more than 36,000 users and 27,000 permissions.
Since the dataset contains over 33000 attributes, our focus
in this experiment is narrowed only to the top requested 18
attributes in the dataset.
Table 3 shows the details about the manual and random
access log datasets. In this table, |P | shows the number of
rules in the original policy, |A| and |V | show the number of
attributes and attribute values, respectively, WSC(pi) shows
the complexity of the mined policy and |L| shows the
number of access control tuples in the given access log.
5.2 Experimental Setup
To evaluate our proposed method, we use a computer
with 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7 and 16 GB of RAM. We used
Python 3 in the mining and the evaluation process. The
algorithms were highly time-efficient (e.g., maximum time
consumption is less than half an hour).
To generate the synthesized access log L we brute force
through all attributes A and their values Va to produce all
possible combinations for the tuples. This method was used
to generate a complete access log for the random and man-
ual policies dataset. We also produced a sparse dataset by
randomly selecting authorization tuples from the complete
dataset. For example, a 20% sparse dataset is generated by
randomly removing 10% of the permitted and 10% of the
denied tuples from the complete access logs. For the noisy
dataset, we combine a portion of the data by setting denied
tuples as permitted and vise versa. For instance, 20% noisy
data contains 10% of the denied tuples in the permitted log
as permitted, and another 10% of the permitted tuples in the
denied log as denied. The average threshold for selecting
effective attributes and relations is between 0.3 and 0.20 in
all experiments.
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TABLE 3
Details of Synthesized Policies
pi |P | |A| |V | WSC(pi) |L |
UniversityP 10 9 42 36 900000
HealthcareP 9 13 39 84 737280
ProjectManagementP 11 9 34 114 102060
UniversityPN 10 9 42 64 900000
HealthcarePN 9 13 39 76 737280
ProjectManagementPN 11 9 34 65 102060
Random 12 9 44 152 1312500
Amazon Kaggle - 10 3063 71 2545
Amazon UCI - 18 30861 92 716063
5.3 Results
Figure 2 shows the final F-scorepi |L (after multiple rounds of
refinement) for all the policies. As we can see, all the policies
have F-score higher than 88% with five out of nine policies
reaching 100% F-score after multiple rounds of refinement.
These numbers are much higher than the Cotrini et al. [18]
and Xu et al. [15] F-score for the same policies which are
reported in [18]. The highest F-score Cotrini et al. [18] could
achieve for the real dataset is around 35% while the reported
Xu et al. F-score for all real datasets is 0% as their proposed
approach is incapable of extracting complex policies.
Fig. 2. Final F-Score of the policies mined by our proposed algorithm.
Figure 3 shows the size of the mined policy for all policy
sets. The policy sizes are all reasonable and manageable and
much lower than the reported policy sizes in [18]. As an
example, the overall mined policy size for Amazon Kaggle
dataset in our approach is 71 while the size of the mined
policy for the same dataset in [18] is more than 1000.
Fig. 3. Size of the policies mined by our proposed algorithm.
Figure 4 shows the improvement of F-score of the mined
policy after each round of refinement for various policy sets.
Some policies (e.g. Amazon Kaggle and Amazon UCI) reach
a 100% F-score after few rounds of refinement while some
policies (e.g. HealthcareP) need more rounds of refinement
to achieve a good F-score.
Fig. 4. Improvement of the F-score of the mined policies after multiple
rounds of refinement.
Figure 5 represents the effect of noisy input access log on
the accuracy of the mined policy for each of manual policies.
Every experiment includes four rounds of refinement. The
0% noise indicates a complete access log without any over-
assignment or under-assignment, while 10% noise shows
that 10% of records are misclassified. As we can see, a
noisy dataset reduces the correctness of the final mined
policy. However, the drop in correctness for HealthcareP and
UniversityP is negligible and even with the presence of 30%
noise the accuracy of the mined policies are over 93%.
Fig. 5. Effect of noise on the accuracy of the mined policies.
Finally, Figure 6 shows the effect of the sparsity of the
input access log on the accuracy of the mined policy for each
of manual policies. Every experiment includes four rounds
of refinement. Here, 0% means that the given access log is
complete while 10% sparsity mean that the given access log
11
misses 10% of the records of the complete access log. The
trends of the graphs show that as the sparsity increases,
the quality of the mined policy in terms of correctness
decreases. However, in the case of UniversityP policy, even
with the 30% sparsity in the authorization logs, our pro-
posed approach reached a 100% accuracy after few rounds
of refinement. This indicates that even though the input log
is sparse but the clusters are well formed and the records
corresponding to each rule is well separated. In addition, as
we omitted the records of the complete log randomly, this
selection may also effect the quality of the final policy. As
we can see, the accuracy of the ProjectManagementP policy
with 30% sparsity is better than its accuracy when access
log is 20% sparse.
Fig. 6. Effect of sparsity on the accuracy of the mined policies.
6 RELATED WORK
As RBAC approach became popular, many organization
decided to equip their information systems with more recent
access control model, however migrating to RBAC from
legacy access control systems was a huge obstacle for such
environments. As a result, several researchers addressed
such a challenge by introducing automated role extraction
algorithms [10], [11], [12], [13], [21], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35],
[36]. Role engineering or role mining are the terms that have
been used to refer to procedures to extract an optimal set of
roles given user-permission assignments.
In [10], Kuhlmann and Schimpf try to discover a set
of roles from user-permission assignments using clustering
techniques, however, they do not show the feasibility of
their proposed approach through experiments. In addition,
their proposed approach lacks a metric to choose the best
model based on their clustering method.
The ORCA role mining tool is proposed by
Schlegelmilch and Steffens and tries to perform a
hierarchical clustering on user-permission assignments
[11]. Their proposed method limits the hierarchical
structure to a tree so that each permission/user is assigned
to one role in the hierarchy. This feature limits the feasibility
of their proposed approach as, in real environments, roles
do not necessarily form a tree.
Ni et al. propose a supervised learning approach for
role mining which maps each user-permission assignment
to a role using a supervised classifier (i.e., a support vector
machine (SVM)) [36]. The main limitation of their proposed
approach is that the roles and some part of the role-
permission assignments are needed beforehand; and hence,
it is not applicable in many organizations.
Vaidya et al. are the first to define the Role Mining
Problem (RMP) formally and analyze its theoretical bounds
[37]. They also propose a heuristic approach for finding
a minimal set of roles for a given set of user-permission
assignments.
Xu and Stoller are the first to propose an algorithm for
mining ABAC policies from RBAC [38], logs [14], and access
control list [15] plus attribute information. Their policy min-
ing algorithms iterate over access control tuples (generated
from available information, e.g., user permission relations
and attributes) and construct candidates rules. They then
generalize the candidate rules by replacing conjuncts in
attribute expressions with constraints. The main limitation
of these algorithms is that as they are based on heuristic
approaches, the proposed techniques work very well for
simple and small scale AC policies, however, as the number
of rules in the policy and the number of elements in each
rule increases, they do not perform well.
Following Xu and Stroller’s proposed method, Medvet
et al. [16] propose a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm
for extracting ABAC policies. The proposed approach is a
separate and conquer algorithm, in each iteration of which,
a new rule is learned and the set of access log tuples
decreases to a smaller size. Their algorithm employs several
search-optimizing features to improve the quality of the
mined rules. Although their approach is a multi-objective
optimization framework which incorporates requirements
on both correctness and expressiveness, it suffers from the
same issue as [15].
Iyer and Masoumzadeh [17] propose a more systematic,
yet heuristic ABAC policy mining approach which is based
on the rule mining algorithm called PRISM. It inherits
shortcomings associated with PRISM that includes dealing
with a large dimensionality of the search space of attribute
values and generation of a huge number of rules.
Cotrini et al. propose an algorithm called Rhapsody for
mining ABAC rules from sparse logs [18]. Their proposed
approach is built upon subgroup discovery algorithms.
They define a novel metric, reliability which measures how
overly permissive an extracted rule is. In addition, they
proposed a universal cross-validation metric for evaluating
the mined policy when the input log is sparse. However,
their algorithm is not capable of mining policies from logs
with many attributes as the number of extracted rules grows
exponentially in the number of attributes of the system.
7 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
As mentioned in section 5.3, our proposed approach is able
to maintain a practical performance when applying to both
synthesized and real datasets. In the case of synthesized
datasets, we demonstrate the approach capability in mining
policies containing both positive and negative attribute fil-
ters from complete datasets. On the other hand, real datasets
show the approach potentials in mining such policies in the
case of sparse datasets. In addition, the real datasets contain
large number of attributes and attribute values as shown
in Table 3. The ability of our proposed approach in mining
high-quality policies for these datasets verifies that the size
of attributes and attribute values has minimal impact on the
effectiveness of our approach.
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Our approach provides consistent results when mining
policies for simple and small access logs as well as complex
and large ones. Our experiments on various datasets with
different levels of sparseness and noise show that the pro-
posed approach maintains a good performance with a slight
drop in the evaluation scores.
The proposed approach is based on an unsupervised
clustering algorithm. Since finding the proper number of
clusters is a challenge in the clustering algorithm, our ap-
proach is subjective to this issue as well. The same issue
appears in finding the best thresholds to extract effective
attributes and relations.
In our evaluation, we used random selection to create
noisy and sparse datasets from complete datasets. Although
we ensured the percentage of randomly selected tuples from
permitted and denied logs, guaranteeing the quality of the
sample is difficult.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an unsupervised learning
based approach to automate ABAC policy extraction. The
proposed approach is capable of discovering both positive
and negative attribute expressions as well as positive and
negative relation conditions while previous approaches in
access control policy extraction had only focused on positive
expressions. Furthermore, our work is capable of improving
the extracted policy through iterations of our proposed rule
pruning and policy refinement algorithms. Such refinement
algorithms are based on the false positive and false negative
records and they help in increasing the quality of the mined
policy.
Most importantly, we have proposed the policy quality
metric which considers both the conciseness and correctness
of the mined policy and is important for comparing the
extracted policy with the original one and improving it if
needed.
We have evaluated our policy extraction algorithm on ac-
cess logs generated for various sample policies and demon-
strated its feasibility. Furthermore, we have shown that our
approach outperforms previous works in terms of policy
quality.
As future work, we plan to extend our method to
support numerical data and extract negative authorization
rules as well while studying the effect of various conflict
resolution strategies on the quality of the mined policy.
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